Using novel data from a crowdsourcing platform for ranking stocks, we investigate how individuals form beliefs about future stock returns. In each contest on the platform, competitors are asked to rank 10 stocks according to their expected performance (% gain) over the course of the contest (usually one week). These rankings allow us to investigate how investors form return expectations on individual stocks in the cross-section. We find that individuals extrapolate from past returns, with more weight on more recent returns, especially when recent returns are negative. Such an extrapolation bias is stronger among large stocks and users who are not financial professionals. The consensus rankings negatively predict future stock returns in the cross-section, consistent with the asset pricing implications of extrapolative beliefs. The return predictability associated with extrapolative beliefs is robust to controlling for past returns over any specific horizons; it extends to large stocks that are not covered on the platform; and it is unlikely driven by liquidity-shock-induced price reversals. ________________________________________ * We thank Nicholas Barberis, Sam Hartzmark, and participants at the Yale Junior Finance Conference and WAPFIN@Stern conference for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Leigh Dorgen and Josh Dulberger from Forcerank.com for their generous support.
Introduction
A central question in finance is how investors form expectations about future returns and how such expectations affect asset prices. Recent works by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) , Koijen, Schmeling, and Vrugt (2015) , and Kuchler and Zafar (2016) provide convincing evidence of return extrapolation, the notion that investors' forecasts of an asset's future returns are a positive function of the asset's past returns. Barberis et al. (2015) develop a dynamic model to show that return extrapolation explains facts about the aggregate stock market such as excess volatility and the predictability of stock market returns.
Despite their elegant and intuitive theoretical appeal, extrapolation models have been empirically tested primarily with aggregate market-level data so far. For example, using survey data on expectations of future stock market returns, Cassella and Gulen (2017) estimate the degree of extrapolation bias (DOX) and confirm that market return predictability is high during high-DOX periods. The difficulty of analyzing extrapolative beliefs and more generally the belief formation process in the cross-section arises in part from the lack of data directly measuring investors' expectations on future returns of individual stocks.
The emergence of financial technology (FinTech) makes it easy for us to survey a large number of individual investors on their expectations for a cross-section of stocks. In this paper, we use a novel dataset from a crowdsourcing platform for ranking stocks (Forcerank.com).
Forcerank collects expectations on future stock performances over specified horizons from highly diverse and geographically distributed individuals. We investigate how individuals form their beliefs about future returns on individual stocks and how such beliefs affect asset prices.
To study how individuals form their beliefs about future returns, we start by developing a cross-sectional model of extrapolation. The model consists of two types of investors, extrapolators and fundamental traders. Extrapolators form beliefs about future returns of individual stocks by extrapolating past returns of these stocks, and they trade stocks according to their beliefs. Fundamental traders, on the other hand, serve as arbitrageurs to correct for mispricing. The model makes specific predictions on how extrapolator beliefs affect return predictability in the cross-section; we test and confirm these predictions later in the paper. The model also highlights conceptual differences between extrapolation in the aggregate market and extrapolation in the cross-section.
With the model at hand, we begin our empirical analysis by estimating an unrestricted regression of investor expectations (measured by the Forcerank data) on past stock returns. Our results show that individuals extrapolate from past returns, with more weight on more recent returnsthe returns 4 weeks earlier are only about 15% as important as the returns in the past
week. In addition, extrapolation is asymmetric: investors put more weight on negative past returns, and they display longer memory for these negative returns.
To parsimoniously study the determinants of investor expectations, we apply an exponential decay function as the weighting scheme on past returns. This specification has also been studied by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and Cassella and Gulen (2017) . In doing so, we summarize the decay pattern into two parameters. The first parameter (1), the overall weight (i.e. a scaling factor multiplied to all the past returns), captures a "level" effectthat is, to what extent individuals respond to past returns. The 1 parameter estimated from the Forcerank expectations data is significantly positive, suggesting that investors expect high future returns when past returns are high. We interpret the difference between the 1 parameter estimated from the Forcerank expectations and the 1 parameter estimated using rational expectations as the degree of overreaction. The second parameter (2), the weight investors put on distant past returns relative to recent past returns when forming beliefs about future returns, captures a "slope" effect; a low 2 means that investors only look into the recent past. The estimation of 2 is significantly positive but also significantly lower than one, suggesting a decreasing pattern of the weights applied to past returns. We interpret 2 as the degree of extrapolation.
One benefit of analyzing extrapolative beliefs in the cross-sectional setting is to study the micro-foundation of extrapolative beliefs and identify other interesting features of the belief formation process. The cross-sectional data allow us to estimate parameters of extrapolative beliefs for individual stocks and for different types of users, thus linking these parameters to stock and user characteristics. For example, we find that financial professionals, compared to non-professionals, display less extrapolation bias by having a longer memory of past returns instead of a larger degree of overreaction. Across different stocks, we document stronger extrapolation bias among larger stocks. Overall, our findings provide insights into better modeling investor beliefs.
We then study the cross-sectional asset pricing implications of the extrapolative beliefs.
Using the Forcerank score as a proxy for extrapolative beliefs, we find the Forcerank score to negatively predict the next-week return in the cross-section. A trading strategy that buys stocks with low scores and sells stocks with high scores generates a significant profit of 9 basis points per day (or over 20 percent per year) after controlling for the Fama-French five-factors and a short-term reversal factor. We also compute a predicted score for each stock as a weighted average of its past four week returns where the weights are calibrated to the beliefs of the Forcerank users. Interestingly, such a predicted score forecasts the stock's future return better than its past return over any specific horizon. This finding, combined with the fact that our sample contains mostly large stocks, suggests that our results are not driven by liquidity-shockinduced short-term return reversals.
We also derive and test additional cross-sectional predictions of a canonical extrapolation model. For example, the model predicts that extrapolative beliefs should have stronger return predictability among stocks whose clienteles are dominated by extrapolators (rather than rational investors). Using the institutional ownership obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database as an instrument for investor clientele, we confirm this model prediction in the data.
One concern about using the Forcerank data is whether the belief formation process we learn from the platform is representative of the thinking process of investors who trade in the market and determine prices. To test the external validity, we conduct an out-of-sample test: we extend our analysis to the sample of stocks that are not covered by the Forcerank platform. To do this, we again compute predicted Forcerank scores for non-Forcerank stocks as weighted averages of their past four week returns where the weights are calibrated to Forcerank data. We find the predicted score to negatively forecast next-week return in the full sample of non-Forcerank stocks. The associated trading strategy delivers highly significant risk-adjusted return, outperforming the standard short-term return reversal strategies that sort on either past one-week or past one-month returns.
Among the largest non-Forcerank stocks, the trading strategy based on the predicted score continues to generate significant risk-adjusted return, even though the standard short-term return reversal strategies fail to work. Our out-of-sample results help to make two points. First, the extrapolative beliefs extracted from the Forerank platform are representative and can be generalized to the entire cross-section of stocks. Second, the return predictability associated with extrapolative beliefs, especially among the largest stocks, is not a result of liquidity shocks. Our findings therefore suggest that extrapolative beliefs also play an important role in explaining the well-documented short-term price reversal. In other words, our paper also contributes to the voluminous literature on short-term reversal starting from Fama (1965 ), Jegadeesh (1990 ), and Lehmann (1990 .
It is worth noting that the Forcerank data have a number of unique advantages compared to alternative data sources. For example, a few other social media platforms (e.g. StockTwits, Seeking Alpha, etc.) also collect cross-sectional opinions or expectations about stock performance. However, these platforms mostly collect textual information from contributors that may not be easily converted to precise quantitative information. Another data source for quantitative cross-sectional expectations is the equity analyst one-year-ahead target prices.
Different from target prices, our data reach a more diverse group of individuals and could therefore enhance our understanding of heterogeneous belief formation in the cross-section. In addition, our data is not subject to the potential "selection bias" that target prices suffer from (Brav and Lehavy 2003) . It is also not affected by biases arising from analyst career concerns and investment banking relations. Notwithstanding these biases, we find suggestive evidence for extrapolative beliefs even among equity analysts, especially after removing the very illiquid penny stocks.
In what follows, we first derive and discuss in Section 2 a canonical cross-sectional extrapolation model which will guide many of our empirical analyses. In Section 3, we then describe in details the crowdsourcing platform and our sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the determinants of investor expectation, where we mainly focus on the relation between investor expectations and past returns. Section 5 shows the predictive power of Forcerank score for future stocks returns as well as the results of out-of-sample test. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are in the Appendix.
Cross-sectional Predictions of an Extrapolation Model
In the behavioral finance literature, a number of extrapolation models have been written to explain the aggregate stock market behavior. So far not many models have been developed for the cross-section of individual stocks. 1 The lack of such models is due to two reasons. First, there has not been a sufficient amount of empirical support for extrapolative expectations in the crosssection. 2 Second, the micro-foundation of extrapolation, especially how investors form beliefs expectations when facing multiple assets, remains unclear. 3
In this section, we develop a simple cross-sectional model of return extrapolation and study its asset pricing implications. We consider a finite-horizon model with T  1 periods, t  0, 1, …, T. There are N  1 assets, one risk-free asset with its interest rate normalized to zero, and N risky assets each as a claim to a single dividend payment at the terminal date that is equal to , , 0 , 1 , ,
where 1 Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a multi-asset extrapolation model to study comovement of stocks within investment styles.
2 Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) provide empirical evidence in the cross-section that is consistent with extrapolation, but they do not directly use expectations data. Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2005) examine analysts' expectations and find little evidence for extrapolation.
3 So far the possible sources of extrapolative expectations include "belief in the law of small numbers" (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Rabin, 2002) , availability heuristic (Jin 2015; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2012), and experience effect (Malmendier and Nagel 2011, 2016) , among others. However, these studies of belief formation have primarily focused on a single risky asset. 
The value of ,0 i D is public information at time 0, and both the market news , 
.
That is, extrapolators' time-t expectation about changes in the price of the risky asset i over the next period is a linear function of the (normalized) weighted average of all past price changes;
we call this (normalized) weighted average of past price changes "sentiment" , . 
, ( , , , , ) .
The time-t per-capita share demand of extrapolators, on the other hand, is
where 1,0 1,1 1, 2,0 2,1 2, 1,0 1,1 1, ,0
We derive the share demands of fundamental traders and extrapolators in the Appendix.
Intuitively, equation (4) suggests that fundamental traders serve as arbitrageurs who correct for mispricing: their share demands are positively related to the fundamental value of the risky assets but negatively related to the risky asset prices. On the other hand, equation (6) suggests that extrapolator demands are positively related to the levels of sentiment. Market clearing conditions imply 1 ,0 ,1 ,2 ,2 , , 1
The pricing equation in (7) further implies that in the context of the model, running the predictability regression of the following
Empirically, the regression analogous to (8) is to regress realized cumulative returns over a subsequent period on the current level of sentiment constructed from a weighted average of past returns.
The pricing equation of (7) demonstrates a role for an amplification factor 1 ,1 ,2
[1 ( / ) (1 )] :
with good news about fundamentals at time t, the risky asset price , i t P gets pushed up, causing extrapolators to increase their share demand on the asset and therefore pushing the price further up. The equilibrium only exists when
which requires a significant population fraction of fundamental traders serving as the counteracting arbitrageurs against mispricing. The analytical results for the regression of (8) links both the belief-based parameters ,1 i  and ,2 i  (at the stock level) and the population fraction of behavioral (rational) agents in the economy to the degree of return predictability.
Specially, Figure 1 below shows the numerical implication of the model that when  E increases, ,1 i  increases, or ,2 i  decreases, the magnitude of the regression coefficient bi of (9) significantly increases.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Intuitively, when  E takes a higher value and when ,2 i  takes a lower value, there are more extrapolators in the economy and each extrapolator is more extrapolative; they increase their weight on recent returns. Together, this gives rise to a larger overvaluation and hence a stronger degree of return predictability. This model implication is consistent with the empirical findings of Cassella and Gulen (2017) . Using time series data of investor surveys and asset prices about the aggregate stock market, they estimate the degree of extrapolation bias (DOX) as an empirical proxy for the aggregate value of 2. They confirm market return predictability to be high during high-DOX periods.
Individual-stock-level investor return expectations data uniquely allow us to test the relation in the cross-section. We hypothesize that return predictability by the sentiment level should be stronger among stocks associated with higher participation of extrapolators.
Conceptually, it is worth noting that the returns for risky asset i, according to (8) 
If we define an equal-weighted market-wide portfolio with its return defined as
As N goes to infinity, the idiosyncratic component , M t  goes to zero. In other words, marketwide sentiment negatively affects future market returns, but its movement becomes independent of idiosyncratic components of firm returns. Equations (8) and (13) highlight some differences between extrapolation in the aggregate market and extrapolation in the cross-section: firm-specific shocks have a direct impact on firm-level extrapolation but much less so on market-wide extrapolation.
Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we provide description and summary statistics for the data from Forcerank.com. Forcerank is a crowdsourcing platform that organizes weekly competitions in which participants enter thematic contests and rank a list of 10 companies according to their expected performance (% gain) over the course of the contest (usually one week). The goal is to correctly match up the rankings with the actual results at the end of the contest period. Figure 2 presents an example of one such contest.
[ Figure 2 about here]
There are several types of games. Most games are comprised within an industry group.
For example, in one game, contestants may be asked to rank 10 stocks from the same Ecommerce industry based on their next-week expected returns. Occasionally, the industry group is further partitioned based on the market capitalizations of the stocks. For example, one game may contain only large stocks from the Biotech industry. The other type of games is based on special themes, such as most heavily shorted stocks, or ETFs. We focus on individual firms in our study and therefore exclude games involving ETFs. Table 1 lists the types of games in our final sample, which covers a period from February 2016 to March 2017. Games are ran weekly, resulting in multiple weekly contests for the same game type.
[ Table 1 about here] Our sample contains mostly industry games (720 out of a total of 774 contests). Popular industries covered in our sample include social media (80 weekly contests), E-commerce (70 weekly contests), Apparel (67 weekly contests) and Commodities (67 weekly contests). Stocks covered in these contests tend to be household names and grab individual investor attention.
Over time, Forcerank expands the game coverage to also include industries such as Fast Food, Investment Banking, Airlines, Semiconductors, etc. The only non-industry game we study involves heavily shorted stocks (54 weekly contests).
Our final sample contains 227 unique stock tickers. It contains 5694 contributions submitted by 606 distinct users. A breakdown of stocks and users can be found in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here] Stocks in our sample tend to be large stocks. The average stock has a market capitalization of $46.6 billion (median is $14.4 billion). Using the NYSE size cutoffs, the average stock in our sample has a quintile rank of 4.22. This fact is important for interpreting our subsequent return predictability results. Given their sizes, our sample stocks are less likely to suffer from short-term return reversals induced by liquidity shocks.
Our sample also gears towards growth stocks. The average stock has a book-to-market ratio of 0.38 (median is 0.25). Their average B/M quintile rank is 2.1.
Our sample covers 606 distinct contestants / users. Their participation is highly skewed.
While half of the users only play two games, the most active 1% of users played 299 contests covering 24 different games.
Among the 606 users, 244 choose to report their professional backgrounds. 72 are financial professionals. We conjecture that financial professionals are less likely to suffer from extrapolation bias. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we confirm this conjecture and use the participation rate of financial professionals as an instrument for extrapolation bias.
Empirical Results: Determinants of Investor Expectations
In this section, we study the formation of investor expectations. We first analyze how past stock returns affect investors' expectations on future stock returns. For each week t,
individuals are asked to submit rankings of 10 companies according to their expected performance over week t  1. For each stock in each contest, we measure the investor expectation by the consensus Forcerank score averaged across all individuals. Each individual's score is assigned as follows: the highest ranked stock gets a score of 10, the second highest ranked stock gets a score of 9, and similarly, the lowest ranked stock gets a score of 1, and the second lowest ranked stock gets a score of 2.
Expectations and past returns: unrestricted model
We start with an unrestricted model with the consensus rank score as the dependent variable and past stock returns as the independent variables:
Forcerank is the week-t consensus rank based on investors' expected performance of stock s over week t  1; , s t i R  represents the lagged return (or the contest-adjusted return) of stock s over week t  i, and i  0 to 3 weeks.
[ Table 3 about here]
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3 . Column (1) uses the raw level of past returns. The results show clear evidence that individuals extrapolate past returns. The coefficients on the past four weekly returns are all positive and significant. In addition, the coefficients are declining, meaning that investors put higher weight on more recent returns.
Given that individuals submit relative rankings on Forcerank, it is possible that the relative levels of returns within a contest are more relevant to form beliefs. In Column (2), we adjust past returns by demeaning them within each contest. That is, we compute contest-adjusted returns by subtracting from raw returns the contest average return. The results remain very similar. The coefficients on past contest-adjusted returns and the R-squared all increase, indicating a better fit of the data.
To take into account that extrapolation of past returns may be nonlinear, Columns (3) and (4) consider different coefficients on the positive contest-adjusted returns and the negative contest-adjusted returns. The results show that extrapolation is asymmetric and is stronger on the negative side. In particular, individuals seem to display longer memory for negative past returns.
While coefficients on positive past returns become insignificant beyond past one week, the coefficients on negative past returns are always strongly significant. In other words, a negative return from four weeks ago still impact current belief formation.
Expectations and past returns: exponential decay model
Using a simple unrestricted specification that allows independent weights on different past returns, we observe a clear decay in the relation between investor expectations and past returns (Panel A of Table 3 ). To capture this decay parsimoniously, we now follow our stylized model in Section 2 and proceed to estimating a parametric extrapolation model which assumes an exponential decay of weights on past returns. Specifically, we examine an empirical version of equation (3) 
This exponential decay specification has also been studied by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and Cassella and Gulen (2017) using aggregate market data. In this way, we could summarize the decay in the relation between past returns and investor expectations into two parameters:
first, the parameter λ1 captures a "level" effect, or the extent to which sentiment drives belief formation. A higher λ1 translates to a stronger impact of extrapolation bias on investor beliefs; second, the parameter λ2 captures a "slope" effect. It governs how past returns are weighted in forming the "sentiment" variable St constructed in (3). A lower λ2 indicates stronger extrapolation bias since more recent past returns receive proportionally higher weights. The interpretations of these two parameters will be discussed in more details in Section 4.4. Table 3 confirms the extrapolation bias using the nonlinear specification for n  3. For example, Column (2) presents the contest-adjusted results. We find positive and significant λ1 of 25.23 and λ2 of 0.436. We focus primarily on the nonlinear specification for the rest of our empirical analysis as it succinctly summarizes the extrapolation bias by two parameters.
Panel B of

Heterogeneous extrapolation
Our cross-sectional setting uniquely allows us to link extrapolation bias to various user and stock characteristics. To shed some lights on the determinants of extrapolation bias, we now repeat the extrapolation model estimation in various subsamples. Table 4 examines the extrapolation bias separately for financial professionals and nonprofessionals. The results from using raw returns (columns (1) and (3)) and contest-adjusted returns (Columns (2) and (4)) are very similar. Interestingly, while the two types of users have very similar λ1 parameters, their λ2 parameters are quite different. Focusing on the contestadjusted results, professionals have a λ2 of 0.704, while non-professionals have a λ2 0.547. The result indicates that non-professionals display stronger extrapolation bias as they have shorter memory and overweight more recent returnsthe weight that non-professionals put on returns decays by about 90% in the first month (1  0.547 4  91%), while the weight applied by professionals takes about two months to decay by 90%.
The longer memory of professionals is also suggested by the data on equity analyst target prices. In the Appendix, we analyze the target price implied next-year stock expected return using consensus target prices collected from I/B/E/S at the end of each year from 1999 to 2015.
We regress the target price implied expected returns (TPER) on lagged annual returns. After excluding illiquid stocks, there is suggestive evidence that equity analysts also seem to extrapolate on past returns, and the weight only becomes statistically insignificant for returns three years earlier.
In subsequent analysis of return predictability, we take advantage of the difference in the expectation formed by professionals and non-professionals, and partition our stock sample based on professional user participation. This partition allows us to generate cross-sectional variation in λ2.
[ Table 4 about here] Table 5 examines the extrapolation bias with different types of stocks. We only report contest-adjusted results as the results using raw returns are very similar. Comparing Columns (1) to (3), we find that the extrapolation bias is stronger among large stocks. Large stocks are associated with both higher λ1 and lower λ2. In other words, users are more likely to overweight recent returns and their sentiment are more likely to drive their beliefs for large stocks. The pattern goes against the notion that liquidity shocks are driving our results.
[ Table 5 about here]
Comparing Column (4) to (6), we do not find a clear difference in the extrapolation bias between growth and value stocks. Growth stocks have lower λ1 and lower λ2. On one hand, a lower λ2 means that sentiment is more likely driven by recent returns, suggesting a stronger extrapolation bias. On the other hand, a lower λ1 reduces the impact of such a sentiment in belief formation.
Finally, Column (7) of Table 5 separately examines the 54 contests (about 7% of our sample) that comprise of heavily shorted stocks. We find a lower λ1 of 14.92 among these stocks.
One possible reason is that heavily shorted stocks may have similar and positive past returns. We learn from Table 3 that positive past returns are less likely associated with extrapolation bias.
Discussion: overreaction vs. extrapolation
We conclude Section 4 by providing some discussion on the concepts of "overreaction" versus "extrapolation." Consider a simple AR(1) process: 
with ˆ.    That is, the perceived return process is less mean-reverting than the true process. In both Greenwood and Hanson (2015) and Landier, Ma, and Thesmar (2017),    is referred as "extrapolation" or sometimes "overreaction." It is worth noting that this differs conceptually from the degree of extrapolation (parameter 2  specified in equation (3)) used in our model and Cassella and Gulen (2017) . To see this, first notice that, from (18), the week-t subjective expectation of the next week's return is
Comparing (19) with an analogous version of equation (16) viewing the Forcerank score as a proxy for investors' subjective expectation of the next week's return:
we can see that (19) is a special case of (20) with
In other words, 1  in our specification is closely related to which measures "overreaction" described in Greenwood and Hanson (2015) and Landier, Ma, and Thesmar (2017), whereas 2  is closely related to the extrapolation parameter  in Barberis et al. (2015) and Cassella and Gulen (2017) .
More precisely, comparing equations (17) and (18) 
where in (22) the week-t rational expectation of return on stock s over week t  1 is now the dependent variable. 4 In doing so, we can think of 1 1 r    as the degree of overreaction and think of 2  as the degree of extrapolation.
Empirical Results: Return Predictability
4 To implement the regression in (22) empirically, we can replace the rational expectations of returns by realized returns.
In our stylized extrapolation model, a sentiment variablethat is, a weighted average of past returnsdrives expectations of future returns. One asset pricing implication of the model is that higher sentiment today predicts a lower future realized return, more so when the participation of rational investors is low. To the extent that the Forcerank score proxies for such a sentiment variable, we would expect it to negatively predict future returns in the cross-section.
Fama-MacBeth regression
We examine the return predictability using Fama-MacBeth regressions where the dependent variable is the individual stock's daily return in week t  1. The regression results are reported in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 about here]
As Column (1) shows, Forcerank scores negatively and significantly predict stock returns over the next week. To isolate the sentiment component of the Forcerank score which is a function of past returns, we consider a predicted Forcerank score. The predicted score is computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Panel B of Table 3 (Column (2)). In other words, it is a weighted average of past four week returns that best predicts the Forcerank score. Columns (2) shows that the predicted score also negatively and significantly predicts stock returns over the next week. The coefficients on the predicted score is very similar in magnitude to that on the raw Forcerank score in Column (1). The finding suggests that the return predictive power behind the Forcerank score primarily comes from its component driven by past returns.
The results also suggest that 1 r  estimated from the rational expectation (equation (22)) should be negative. However, as previously shown in Panel B of Table 3 , 1 estimated from investor expectations (measured by Forcerank scores) is positive. The fact that 1 is greater than 1 r  implies that there is overreaction in investor expectations.
Of course, a large literature on short-term return reversal has already shown that past return itself negatively predicts future return and such a reversal maybe driven by liquidity shocks unrelated to extrapolation bias (Jegadeesh and Titman 1995; Campbell, Grossman and Wang 1993, among others). In addition, return reversal tends to be stronger among similar stocks in the same industry (see Da, Liu, and Schaumburg 2014, among others) . Since contests in our sample mostly include similar stocks in the same industry, a natural question is whether the predictive power associated with the Forcerank score simply reflects liquidity-shock-induced return reversal. A prior, we do not expect liquidity shocks to affect our sample stocks since they tend to be large stocks as evident in Table 2 .
To address this question more directly, we examine short-term return reversal explicitly in the regressions. For each stock, we assign a quintile score based on either its contest-adjusted past one-week return (Ret(t)) or its contest-adjusted past one-month return (Ret(t 3, t)). Column
(3) shows that the past one-week return does not have significant predictive power on future oneweek return, even after contest adjustment. Column (4) shows that the past one-month return has marginally significant predictive power on future one-week return, after contest adjustment.
Overall, the evidence suggests that only a weak standard short-term return reversal is present in our sample.
More importantly, Columns (5) and (6) show that Forcerank score and predicted score both drive out past return measures when they are included in the same regression. Recall that the predicted score is simply a weighted average of past four weekly returns. The fact that the weighted average return, calibrated to extrapolative beliefs, drives out both the recent one-week return and the recent one-month return (an equal-weighted average), and hence supports the predictions of an extrapolation model.
Portfolio test
We evaluate the economic magnitude associated with return predictability by forming trading strategies. At the beginning of each week, we sort the stocks on different variables and divide the sample into five quintiles. The portfolio is rebalanced every week. Stocks whose prices are below five dollars at the beginning of each week are removed. The results are shown in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 about here]
Column (1) sorts stocks on the consensus Forcerank scores. It shows that Forcerank scores predict future stock returnsthere is a monotonic negative relationship between Forcerank scores and stock returns of week t  1. The high-score-minus-low-score return spread is 11.5 bps per week (t-value of 2.21). The return spread remains to be significant after risk adjustments using the CAPM, the Fama-French five-factor model, or the five-factor model augmented with a short-term reversal factor.
Column (2) sorts stocks on the predicted Forcerank scores. It again shows a monotonic negative relationship between the predicted scores and stock returns of week t  1. The highscore-minus-low-score return spread is 10.2 bps per week (t-value of 2.26). The return spread hardly changes even after controlling for the Fama-French five factors and the short-term reversal factor. The six-factor alpha is still 9.2 bps per week (t-value = 2.02).
Columns (3) and (4) show that the standard short-term return reversals are actually not economically significant in our sample. Neither sorting on past-one week returns nor sorting on past one-month returns generates significant return spreads. In particular, the negative relationship between the past one-month returns and the future one-week returns is not monotonic, explaining the lack of significant trading strategy return, even though past one-month return is marginally significant in regression in Table 6 .
Our stylized model also predicts that the return predictability of sentiment is stronger among stocks with less rational investor participation (or the presence of more extrapolators).
We test this cross-sectional prediction in Table 8 . The evidence in Table 4 suggests that financial professionals display less extrapolation bias. Hence we proxy the rational investor participation using institutional ownership obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. For each stock, we measure institutional ownership as the fraction of shares owned by institutions at the end of December of 2015. We then partition our sample stocks using this measure.
[ Table 8 about here] Table 8 runs the Fama-MacBeth return predictive regressions (as in Table 6 ) separately for stocks with below-median institutional ownership (more extrapolators) and for stocks with above-median institutional ownership (less extrapolators). The results confirm that the return predictability of Forcerank score and predicted score are only present when more extrapolators trade on the stocks.
Out-of-sample results
So far we have examined a sample of 227 unique stocks and 606 users on the Forcerank platform. One potential concern is regarding the generalizability of the extrapolative beliefs extracted from Forcerank. As an out-of-sample validation test, we study the return predictability among stocks that are not covered by Forcerank. If the belief structure estimated from Forcerank data represents the belief formation process of the extrapolators who trade in the market, we would expect that the predicted Forcerank scores for non-Forcerank stocks also has predictive power for future returns.
To do this, we compute predicted Forcerank scores for non-Forcerank stocks as weighted averages of their past four week returns where the weights are calibrated to Forcerank data.
Specifically, the predicted Forerank score is computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Panel B of Table 3 using lagged industry Fama-French 10 industry adjusted returns from week t  3 to week t. To evaluate the economic magnitude associated with the return predictability, we again consider trading strategies, similar to those in Table 7 . The trading strategy results are reported in Table 9 . Stocks whose prices are below five dollars at the beginning of each week are removed.
[ Table 9 about here] Panel A includes all stocks not covered by Forcerank. Column (1) sorts them on the predicted Forerank scores every week and report the quintile portfolio performance in the next week. As in the Forcerank sample, we again observe a monotonic negative relation between the predicted scores and stock returns. The high-score-minus-low-score return spread is 7.2 bps per
week (t-value of 4.70). The spread remains highly significant after various risk adjustments.
For comparison, Columns (2) and (3) report the performance of the standard industryneutral short-term return reversal strategies that sort on past one-week returns or past one-month returns. While they also produce statistically significant trading strategy returns, the magnitude of the return spreads are much smaller to those in Column (1). Extrapolative beliefs, by applying declining weights to past weekly returns, predict future return better than past weekly returns in any specific horizons.
Could the return predictability be a simple manifestation of liquidity shocks that cause initial price pressure and subsequent price reversal? To address this concern, in Panel B, we repeat the trading strategies among the largest non-Forcerank stocks (those in the top CRSP size quintile) that are least likely to suffer from illiquidity. Not surprisingly, the standard short-term return reversal strategies are no longer profitable among these largest stocks as evident in
Columns (2) and (3). In sharp contrast, predicted Forerank score based on extrapolative beliefs still generates a statistically and economically significant spread of 4.3 bps per week (t-value of 2.83). These findings therefore suggest that extrapolative beliefs also play an important role in explaining the well-documented short-term price reversal, especially among large stocks.
Conclusion
Taking advantage of novel data from a crowdsourcing platform (Forcerank.com) for ranking stocks, we provide strong empirical evidence that investors extrapolate on recent past returns when forming expectations about future returns. Our cross-sectional setting allows us to link such an extrapolation bias to stock and user characteristics. For example, we find a stronger extrapolation bias among large stocks and users who are not financial professionals.
We compute a predicted score for each stock as a weighted average of its past four week returns where the weights are calibrated to Forcerank users' extrapolative beliefs. Interestingly, such a score predicts the stock's future return better than its past return over any specific horizon and even out-of-sample. This finding, combined with the fact that our sample contains mostly large stocks, suggests that our results are not driven by liquidity-shock-induced short-term return reversals. Instead, the return predictability supports the asset pricing implications of a canonical extrapolation model.
Appendix A.1. Proofs A micro-foundation for fundamental trader demand in Equation (4).
In this model, there are two types of investors, fundamental traders and extrapolators. fundamental traders make up a fraction  E of the total population, and extrapolators make up the remaining  F ( 1   E ).
Each fundamental investor has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences defined over next period's wealth with risk aversion . At time t, she maximizes
 is the variance-covariance matrix of next period's price changes perceived by fundamental traders at time t, and 1, 2, 1, , ( , , , , ) .
) .
That is, for simplicity, we assume that fundamental traders believe that the covariance for changes in price is the same as the covariance for changes in fundamentals. At time T  1, knowing 1, 2,
,
Market clearing implies , , , ) .
a bounded rationality assumption that fundamental traders expect that other people in the market will demand the per-capita supply of the risky assets over the next period,
Recursively, demands from fundamental traders are
which is Equation (4) in the main text.
A micro-foundation for extrapolator demand in Equation (6).
Same as fundamental traders, each extrapolator also has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences defined over next period's wealth with risk aversion . At time t, she maximizes
We further make the assumptions that ,
and that , 1 , ,0 ,1 ,2 ,2 , , 1 ,0 ,1 , 0
The first-order condition of (A9) then gives rise to Equation (6) in the main text.
Appendix A.2. Additional analysis: equity analyst target price
We acknowledge the existence of other data source on stock-level investor return expectations. For example, Value Line provides three-to-five year target price on individual stocks at quarterly frequency. The implied long-term expected return forecasts are mostly driven by measures of systematic risk such as the CAPM beta. The sell-side equity analysts provide one-year-ahead target price on individual stocks. Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely (2005) regress the implied next-year expected return on the past one-year return and find little evidence for extrapolation.
On the surface of it, the equity analyst target price directly measures investor expectation of the next-year stock price. An important caveat, however, is that these target prices suffer from a "selection bias." Brav and Lehavy (2003) document that analysts are more likely to issue target prices in support of a buy/strong buy recommendation. Consistent with this upward bias, they find the consensus target price to be 32.9% higher than the current market price. Indeed, Da and Schaumburg (2011) show that only the relative valuation implied by the price targets of similar stocks is informative. Forcerank focuses on such relative valuation directly, and in sharp contrast to the case of equity analyst target price coverage, users on Forcerank.com have to cover all stocks in the contests.
Nevertheless, to the extent that equity analyst target prices reveal the expectation of sophisticated institutional investors while users on Forcerank.com are more likely to be individual investors, comparing and contrasting these two sets of expectation data could be informative.
In Table A1 , we analyze the target price implied next-year stock expected return using consensus target prices collected from I/B/E/S at the end of each year from 1999 to 2015. We regress the target price implied expected returns (TPER) on lagged annual returns. Similar to previous literature, we find little evidence that supports extrapolative expectation. Columns (1) and (2) include all returns in the form of levels. The coefficient on the past year returns, Ret(t), is significantly negative, which could be mechanical since the end-of-year price shows up in TPER via denominator while in Ret(t) via numerator and it is not perfectly synchronized with the consensus target prices used in computing TPER. 5 Interestingly, the coefficients on the lagged returns of year t  1 and t  2 are sensitive to the sample and become significantly positive after removing illiquid stocks with low prices (≤ $5). The results are similar even if we include all returns in relative terms in Columns (3) and (4). Overall, after excluding illiquid stocks, there is suggestive evidence that equity analysts also seem to extrapolate on past returns.
[ Table A1 about here] 5 Since the equity analysts' target prices are not frequently updated, individual target prices used in computing the consensus could be stale. In sharp contrast, the Forceranks are all collected during the same week in each contest. Figure 1: The relation between return predictability and parameters  E ,  1 , and  2 .
Tables and Figures
Panel A plots the regression coefficient for regressing the subsequent one-week change in price P t1  P t on the current sentiment level S t as a function of the parameter  E , the fraction of extrapolators in the economy. Panel B plots the same regression coefficient as a function of the parameter  1 . Panel C plots the regression coefficient as a function of the parameter  2 . The default parameter values are  E  0.5,  1  1, and  2  0.4.
Figure 2: Example of Forcerank interface.
The figure on the left presents a screenshot of the interface for a contest for the E-Commerce industry which begins at 9:30am June 20 th , 2016 and ends at 4:00pm June 24 th , 2016. The current time is 11:44am and the time remaining to enter the contest is 3 days 21 hours 45 minutes and 45 seconds. The user could drag the bars with company names to rank these stocks. The figure on the right presents a screenshot of the scoring page. The right column under "Live" displays the actual ranking of stocks based on the realized returns during the contest period. The left column under "Your Forcerank" shows the ranking submitted by the user "Aaron" with the corresponding scores earned for this contest. The scores are based on the difference between the user's rank and the actual rank with a ranking multiplier. More weights are applied to rankings at the top and the bottom. The table presents the results of contest-level regression. For each week t, individuals are asked to submit rankings of 10 companies according to their expected performance over week t  1. The dependent variable is the consensus rank (1-10), which is based on the stock's average ranking (about expected stock performance over week t  1) across all individuals: the highest ranked stock gets a score of 10, the second highest ranked stock gets a score of 9, and similarly, the lowest ranked stock gets a score of 1, and the second lowest ranked stock gets a score of 2. The explanatory variables include lagged returns from week t  3 to week t. Panel A reports the results of linear regression specified in equation (15) of the main text. Column (1) uses the raw level of past returns. Columns (2)-(4) uses contest-adjusted returns ( raw return -contest average return). Columns (3) and (4) are from one single regression, where positive (negative) contest-adjusted returns equal to the contest-adjusted returns for the positive (negative) region and are set to zero otherwise. Panel B implements a nonlinear regression specified in equation (16) of the main text:
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * -significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level. The table presents the results of contest-level regression for professional users vs. non-professional users. For each week t, individuals are asked to submit rankings of 10 companies according to their expected performance over week t  1. The dependent variable is the consensus rank (1-10) averaged across professional users (Cols (1) and (2)) or non-professional users (Cols (3) and (4)), which is based on the stock's average ranking (about expected stock performance over week t  1): the highest ranked stock gets a score of 10, the second highest ranked stock gets a score of 9, and similarly, the lowest ranked stock gets a score of 1, and the second lowest ranked stock gets a score of 2. The explanatory variables include lagged returns from week t  3 to week t. The regression is based on a nonlinear regression specified in equation (16) of the main text:
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * -significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
(1) (1) to (3) partitioned all industry contests into three groups based on the average market cap of stocks in each contest. Cols (4) to (6) partitioned all industry contests into three groups based on the average book-tomarket ratio of stocks in each contest. Col (7) include most heavily shorted stocks. For each week t, individuals are asked to submit rankings of 10 companies according to their expected performance over week t  1. The dependent variable is the consensus rank (1-10) averaged across professional users (Cols (1) and (2)) or non-professional users (Cols (3) and (4)), which is based on the stock's average ranking (about expected stock performance over week t  1): the highest ranked stock gets a score of 10, the second highest ranked stock gets a score of 9, and similarly, the lowest ranked stock gets a score of 1, and the second lowest ranked stock gets a score of 2. The explanatory variables include lagged returns from week t  3 to week t. The regression is based on a nonlinear regression specified in equation (16) of the main text:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2)). ***, **, * -significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
(1) (2)), lagged contest-adjusted return of week t (Col (3) ) and lagged contest adjusted monthly return (Col (4)). All stocks are equally weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar week. Calendar-time alphas are estimated using raw returns, the CAPM, Fama-French five-factor model alone and with the short-term reversal factor. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
(1) This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of individual stock returns. For each week t, individuals are asked to submit rankings of 10 companies according to their expected performance over week t  1. The dependent variable is the daily stock return of week t  1. The explanatory variables are the average Forcerank scores and variables related to the lagged stock returns. The average Forcerank scores are the average of the Forcerank ordinal consensus ranks of the same stock across contests. The predicted score is computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Panel B of Table 3 (Col (2)). All stocks are partitioned into two groups by institutional ownership, which is obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and measured at the end of December of 2015. The ownership is set to zero if there is no institution in the database reporting its ownership of the stock. Stocks with low institutional ownership have the fraction of shares owned by institutions below median. ***, **, * -significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
(1) week t+1, all stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their predicted Forcerank score (Col (1) which is computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Panel B of Table 3 using lagged FF10 industry adjusted returns from week t  3 to week t), lagged industry adjusted return of week t (Col (2)) and lagged industry adjusted monthly return (Col (3)). Stocks with a price below five dollars a share at the beginning of each calendar week are removed from the sample. All stocks are equally weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar week. Calendar-time alphas are estimated using raw returns, the CAPM, Fama-French five-factor model alone and with the short-term reversal factor. Returns are in daily percent, and the t-statistics are in parentheses. *10%, **5%, ***1% significance. The table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regression. The dependent variable is the expected return of year t  1 implied by the consensus target price by analysts. The explanatory variables include lagged returns from year t  3 to year t. In Columns (1) and (2), all returns are included in the form of levels. In Columns (3) and (4), all returns are included in the form of percentile rank within the same year. The sample for Columns (1) and (3) include all stocks, while the sample for Columns (2) and (4) include stocks with prices greater than 5. ***, **, * -significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
(1) 
